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Argentina’s economic crisis has strong similarities with previous crises stretching back to the
nineteenth century. A common thread runs through all these crises: the interaction of a weak,
undisciplined, or corruptible banking sector, and some other group of conspirators from the
public or private sector that hasten its collapse. This pampean propensity for crony finance was
dubbed “gaucho banking” more than one hundred years ago. What happens when such a rotten
structure interacts with a convertibility plan? We compare the 1929   and 2001 crises—the two
instances where rigid convertibility plans failed—and reach two main conclusions. First, a
seemingly robust currency-board can be devastated by an ill-conceived approach to the problems
of internal and external convertibility (or, to rephrase Gresham, “bad inside money drives out
good outside money”). Second, when modern economic orthodoxy collides with caudillo-style
institutional backwardness, a desperate regime with its hands tied in both monetary and fiscal
domains will be sorely tempted by a “capital levy” on the financial sector (for, as Willie Sutton
said when asked why he robbed banks, “because that’s where the money is”).
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1. Argentina’s Crisis in Historical Perspective
An Argentine economic experiment has come to an ignominious end. The attempt to establish a
stable currency has given way to an unplanned float and a fourfold devaluation has rendered null
any chance of restoring the old parity. In addition to a widespread economic malaise following
some years of a boom, one of the major casualties of the crisis is the banking sector, where the
search for a long-run cure has barely begun. The fiscal health of the government remains under a
cloud of suspicion. Foreign investors in government bonds, badly burned, are ill disposed toward
the country. Most observers agree that the political class has failed, and some have suggested that
nothing less then placing the country in “economic receivership” and turning its affairs over to an
independent foreign administrator will rectify the situation:
Investors here, with minds disorganized by the fate which has overtaken those
concerned in the reckless speculations and borrowings of the past years, seem to
conclude that Argentina is ruined because they, themselves, have lost money.
Reckless speculators in the Argentine republic have lost money because they
carried their speculation to undue lengths; but the Argentines have profited and
the country is profiting by the sowing broad-cast of [foreign] capital in the
country.
A  solid  administration  is  required  under  an  honest  President.  Some
assistance in the formation of a bank upon sounds principles is needed, with
improvement in the currency. It is possible that the system of taxation might be
varied so as to provide for the provincial and municipal loans which were too
readily granted; though probabilities disincline an observer to conclude that local
taxation will be increased without great difficulty.
Suggestions have been hazarded relative to foreign financial control.
Foreign financial control may be needed, and may be possible in the case of a
feeble or a decaying state.
1
As the reader may have guessed from the florid tone and antiquated style of this prose,
the year is not 2002. It is 1891. A certain W. H. Bishop is writing for a new publication called the
Economic Journal as Argentina gropes its way through the wreckage of what we have previously
characterized as the world’s first fully-fledged emerging market crisis, the Baring Crash of 1890.
2
The year 1890 has stood ever since in the Argentine historiography as a fateful year of unmatched
economic calamity.
Given the scale of the present crisis, and the economic, social, and political wounds it has
opened up,   perhaps from now on Argentine economic history will be rewritten from a very
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different perspective, with 2001 seen as a turning point. Yet the lessons from the past are
hauntingly familiar, and are here once again to be relearned. How will history be rewritten? It is
not  just  that  the  events  of  2001–02  are  more  catastrophic  than  those  of  1890–91.  Indeed,
Argentina has suffered a steady stream of economic crises throughout her history. One purpose of
this article is to highlight the common features of these episodes and place the present debacle in
some historical perspective. There are also differences, which we are careful to spell out, that
separate the present from the past.
In this paper we argue that the inability of Argentina to ever develop sound banking
institutions doomed all previous attempts to reform the monetary regime using exchange-rate
based stabilizations. We see the “twin crisis” problem noted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) as
endemic to Argentina. This begs the question: what are the “deep causes” that have doomed so
many reform programs?
Crony leadership is one factor.   The Asian developing countries were also faulted for
their “crony capitalism” after the 1997 crisis. In both Asia and Argentina, cronyinsm reached
deep into the financial sector. The failure of key banking and financial institutions to follow
prudent,  transparent,  accountable,  and  non-corrupt  practices  is,  we  think,  as  central  to
understanding the Argentine crisis of 2001 as it was to understanding the Asian crisis of 1997.
It is also a recurring theme in the long history of Argentine crises (listed in   Table 1).
There is, in fact, a much older name for this phenomenon. When this problem first emerged on
the River Plate, a memorable moniker was crafted by our correspondent, the same Lawson, who
wrote of the Baring Crash in his 1891 article “Gaucho Banking”:
[Argentine banks] were free banks in the freest sense of the term, for any Gaucho
who had the political open sesame to them could ask for almost anything he
pleased, and it would be given him so long as there was a piastre left in the till.
3
We resurrect the term “Gaucho Banking” here to refer to the recurring way in which
convertibility plans in Argentina have foundered on a misunderstanding of the internal and
external convertibility nexus in a small open economy with cronyism. It is well known that, as a
corollary of the macroeconomic trilemma, there can be no lender-of-last-resort action by a central
bank that adopts a currency board, so such a regime is potentially fragile on the banking side.
Given such a regime choice—a choice made knowing all the risks, and with a willingness to
accept bank fragility as a price to be paid—bank fragility need not endanger the convertibility
plan itself. What can endanger convertibility is another, deeper, institutional weakness, prevalent
in Argentina and also in other developing countries: the possibility that banks might engage in
crony relationships with private or public borrowers that corrupt￿ balance sheets.
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This is how we read the Argentine dynamics of the second quarter of 2001. Changing the
convertibility laws appeared might have appeared innocent at first glance, because international
reserves were not touched. But whilst base money looked sound, the institutional change, allowed
banks to substitute public bonds for reserves on their balance sheets, eroding public confidence in
bank-created money.
We think that the banks should be viewed as accomplices rather than victims, because
they showed no resistance to “moral” suasion by the authorities. Indeed many bankers welcomed
the chance to earn big returns in the short run. It was, they thought, a safe bet: high yields if the
plan worked, and a freeze/bailout (or pesification) if it didn’t.
4 (And they were right, as it turned
out.) This was the key institutional shock that, in a situation of tension between internal and
external convertibility, took Argentina’s economy off a stable path and onto the highway to hell.
This particular set of policy choices represents a bad  way to handle a crisis, even by the
admittedly weak standards of  past Argentine economic policymaking. In terms of economic
losses, as Table 1 shows,  this crash will likely be more severe than anything seen before, even
than the harsh downturn of 1914 (which, in turn, exceeded the Baring Crash in depth and
duration).
5 It is also clear that the special exchange rate arrangements that prevailed at the onset
the present crisis were  present during only one previous crisis episode—that of 1929—when the
country’s first currency board (created in 1891 after the Baring Crash) finally met its demise.
Thus, in what follows we offer two analytic narratives, one for the 1929 crash and one for the
2001 crash, the two crises where we find the parallels to be strongest.
Table  1 shows the major “twin crisis” episodes since the unification of the modern
Argentine state in 1862, plus a classification of monetary and banking arrangements.
6 Exchange
rate experiments throughout Argentine history have often oscillated between periods of very
loose floating ( a “freely falling” currency, as Reinhart and Rogoff 2002 say), and periods of
more or less hard pegs. The gold and dollar standards backed by currency boards were the harder
regimes, and the dirty floats and crawling pegs rather softer. The willingness to experiment so
                                                       
4 By “pesification” we mean a change in the law of contracts such that contracts denominated ex ante in
U.S. dollars (including bank deposits and loans) would instantly become “de-dollarized” contacts by fiat,
and would ex post be in the same amount but in Argentine pesos. On the intellectual origins of this idea see
Hausmann (2001).
5 Output is about 22% below the 1998 peak based on current data. Even with 5% growth for four years
(which not even the most optimistic forecasts allow) this would generate a situation where the economy
spends 8 years below its previous peak. This surpasses all previous experience.
6 The crisis of the 1870s, although very important in economic terms, did not embody all of the twin crisis
attributes that would allow us to choose it as the earlier example of a modern emerging-market twin crisis.
In that crisis the Avellaneda administration faced unsustainable deficits and debt service burdens inherited
from the preceding Sarmiento administration. The response in the short run was to monetize the fiscal gap
without any major adjustment in the fundamentals. Predictably, the exchange rate eventually collapsed, but
no major banking crisis occurred, and we can see that this episode has all the hallmarks of a classic “first
generation” speculative attack model (Krugman 1979), and none of the more complex attributes of a twin
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freely with different regimes is, of course, a time-honored tradition in Argentina—and indeed all
of Latin America—creating the kind of reputational problems noted by the English correspondent
W. R. Lawson in 1899:
[South Americans] are always in trouble about their currency. Either it is too
good for home use, or, as frequently happens, it is too bad for foreign exchange.
Generally they have too much of it, but their own idea is that they never have
enough…. The Argentines alter their currency almost as frequently as they
change their presidents…. No people in the world take a keener interest in
currency experiments than the Argentines.
7
Just as exchange rate regimes have changed over time, so have banking regimes—at least
at first glance. The Baring Crash was quite distinct in that it occurred under a heterodox banking
experiment,  known  as  the  Law  of  National  Guaranteed  Banks.  This  was  an  unsustainable
regulatory framework,  replete with moral hazard and other defects, and which was swept away
after 1890. Thereafter and until the 1930s, banks were regulated by the commercial code, with no
special banking code whatsoever. Although at its creation in 1935 the Central Bank was given
broad responsibilities for banking oversight,  it was not until comprehensive banking laws were
promulgated in 1977 that any modern basis for supervision was set in place.
The demise of both hard and soft pegs have been associated with economic volatility by
various measures. For example, in 1890 the Argentine regime had floated away from gold parity
by a cumulative 100% over the previous five years of overheated boom; the Baring Crash
accelerated existing nominal movements, and was followed by a deep recession. With purchasing
power parity holding fairly strictly for this economy throughout its history, and with half-lives of
adjustment of two years or so, it is not surprising to see exchange rates and prices track each other
so closely, except in the case of the global inflation after 1914 and deflation after 1929, times
when the foreign price level was more volatile.
Table 1 suggests that the present crisis might break all records for output losses: output is
far below the peak of 1997–98, may go still lower, and seems unlikely to regain its former peak
before 2005 based on even the most optimistic projections. Judging by the nominal criteria, this
crisis has thus far avoided the hyperinflationary tendencies of the 1980s collapses, but nominal
adjustments have already matched or exceeded those seen during the Baring Crash, and certainly
anything witnessed during the breaks in earlier hard pegs in 1914 and 1929.
The table also shows monetary and banking statistics that allow us to compare the
financial contours of this crisis with earlier episodes. One interesting feature of these data is that
they reveal a clear tendency toward financial underdevelopment in the Argentine economy over
the long run. Each successive crisis has tended to boost velocity and drive still lower the
                                                       
7 Banker’s Magazine (1899, p. 691), quoted in Ford (1962, p. 90).della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
5
multiplier as the public fled bank money for cash. (The lone exception was the fall in the
multiplier in the hyperinflation of 1988–90, when a flight from pesos to dollars drove M0 down
faster than M3.)
After a century or more of money and banking fiascos, Argentines are very wary of
putting their assets in peso cash (outside money) or in peso deposits (inside money). That is why
recent measures of money velocity and the money multiplier register little improvement over
figures seen a hundred years ago. Even   relatively tranquil times   such as the long postwar
interlude from the 1940s to the 1970s, showed stunted financial development,   because the
techniques used to contain banking crises—policies of financial repression—were also inimical to
long run financial development (McKinnon 1973).
The 1991 convertibility plan had the potential to reverse the trend of financial involution.
The plan went beyond simply introducing an ultra-hard fixed exchange rate regime. A failure to
grasp this point has been one of the common misunderstandings of Argentine policy during the
last  decade.  The  Argentine  experiment  of  the  1990s  was  harder  still,  since  it  allowed  for
dollarized contracts. The law sought to restore credibility to the peso not just by pegging to the
dollar  but  by  deliberately  and  legally  embedding  financial  dollarization  throughout  the
economy—thus raising the economic and political cost even  further for any government tempted
to countenance devaluation. The regime thus made even a prudent “exit strategy” difficult to
devise.
If  this  regime  was  to  fail,  it  would  do  so spectacularly. In this respect it did not
disappoint.  In  the  short  run,  the  violation  of  contracts  caused  by  “pesification”  has  raised
questions about institutions, property rights, and the basic rule of law. Yet even if these cracks are
smoothed over, unprecedented problems remain. In past crises, some strategic decisions were
taken to preserve a semblance of reputation in some spheres. The long-run budget constraint
required someone to bear the pain, so partial default was needed. One or two levers could be
pulled: the government could maybe default  on debt, either  internally or externally; or  default
on money holdings via inflation; or temporarily freeze assets and impose forced conversions. This
time the authorities have pulled all the levers at the same time. In this sense,  the past may
provide limited guidance as to   what comes next in Argentina, but leadership will be much in
need again.
When Bishop, writing in 1890 summed up his article, he noted that radical solutions like
foreign financial control were perhaps necessary in a “feeble or decaying state” but that Argentina
was not in that position: it was in his view “a vigorous and growing state” where “material wealth
exists and is developing.” He also believed that Argentina was willing to patiently endure the
sacrifice  needed  to  rebuild  a  tattered  reputation,  and  he  quoted  a  remarkable  assertion  by
President Nicolás Avellaneda, the leader who guided the country through a crisis in the 1870s,della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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and who said that “we will suffer thirst and hunger rather than not pay our debts” (Bishop 1891,
538).
If a leader could navigate the present crisis as well as his predecessor did the 1890s, there
would be much less to fear in the form of economic suffering in the short run. Back then a new
commitment to fiscal prudence ensued under President Carlos Pellegrini. The Baring Crash had
brought down the economically reckless regime of Miguel Juárez Celman, yet his vice president
was of a different stripe. Through fiscal reforms at home and principled negotiation with creditors
abroad, he laid the foundations for a return to stability and growth after the restoration of
convertibility in 1899. He also reformed the banking sector in ways that were to restore stability
in the medium term. Pellegrini’s management of a debilitating economic crisis was courageous
and  inspired.  But  his and subsequent administrations failed in one key respect, leaving an
internal-external convertibility weakness at the heart of the Argentine economy. This weakness
was exposed in 1929.
8 The same flaw, obscured for many years by the strictures of financial
repression at home and isolation from the global economy abroad,  returned to center stage in the
late 1990s, to be confronted by current and  future administrations.
Unfortunately for Argentina, the spirit of Gaucho Banking has remained alive and well
throughout  the twentieth century. It affected  both public and private banks, their relationships
with both public and private creditors, and the sustainability of exchange rate regimes. In the rest
of this paper we discuss the dynamics of internal and external convertibility, and then present a
discussion of the 1929 and 2001 crises. Our aim is to illustrate how the problems of Gaucho
banking endured and ultimately brought down two convertibility experiments that for many years
looked nearly indestructible.
9
2. Gaucho Banking in Theory and History
We have argued that a useful model of the internal-external convertibility nexus in the Argentine
historical context can be found in an augmented version of the Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984)
model, one which includes an allowance for possible “Gaucho Banking” behavior (see della
Paolera and Taylor 2002). A theoretical appendix to this paper spells out this model in detail, but
we discuss the core element here. The general intuition has much in common with several
important advances in the recent theoretical literature that stress the linkages between fixed
                                                       
8 That such a flaw should erupt in the 1920s comes as no surprise since many countries other than
Argentina had to grapple with similar problems in a shifting political economy situation in the interwar
period. At that time, “gold standard rules”—no matter how hard they appeared on paper—proved rather
ineffective once the underlying political commitment dissolved or institutional pollution arose, changes that
rendered  a  hard  peg  much  less  credible  (Obstfeld  and  Taylor  2003).  One  might  view  the  dramatic
worsening of Argentina’s country risk in 2001 under the “dollar exchange standard” in the same light.
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exchange rates, monetary policy inconsistencies, and banking crises (see, inter alia, Velasco
1987; Chang and Velasco 2000; Burnside et al. 2001).
The dynamic assumptions are a critical part of the model and describe the forces affecting
the evolution of inside and outside money under a currency board and a fractional reserve
banking system. Regarding inside money, we consider the possibilities of “good” banks and
“crony” (Gaucho) banks, where the banking sector, for simplicity, is treated as consolidated.
10
Good bank policy is driven by a desired reserve-deposit ratio r*(i), where r* is a decreasing
function of the (endogenous) interest rate i. Here, better lending opportunities lead the bank to
reduce the liquidity of its balance sheet in a prudent way so as to seek profits, but the actual
adjustment of r to its target level r* is a partial adjustment process, due to the illiquidity of assets
or other adjustment costs, so that
dr/dt = ν (r*(i) – r) + ν φ(r),
where r*´ < 0 and ν > 0 is an adjustment-speed parameter. The term φ(r) is assumed to be zero for
r > r2 > 0.
However, when reserves fall to dangerously low levels r < r2 we assume that φ(r) might
be nonzero, and additional lending motives start to operate. We can imagine two possible ways in
which the term φ(r) could operate. The first has φ(r) > 0, φ´(r) < 0, and φ´´(r) > 0 for r < r2; we
might call this the conventional “credit crunch” dynamic, since as reserves get precariously low
the good bank might tighten credit even more, scrambling to liquidate loans and prop up r. But
there is another possibility, with φ(r) < 0, φ´(r) > 0, and φ´´(r) < 0 for r < r2; in this case the bank
loosens credit as reserves tumble; this we call the “crony bailout” dynamic, where the bank
chooses to sacrifice its own balance sheet to keep others afloat. Why private or public banks
should choose to do this, of course, is a political economy problem that we analyze shortly.
Outside money evolution is described by the dynamics of the stock of the reserves of
gold (or hard currency), and we assume a rate of gold inflow that is driven by deviations of the
(endogenous) local interest rate i from the world rate i*.
11 Thus,
                                                       
10 Following Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984), in our model of the 1929 crisis we are ignoring here the role of
other private banks. That is, we treat the Banco de la Nación, which already accounted for 50% of the
banking sector by the 1930s, as a proxy for the entire system. However, an alternative view would be to
integrate the balance sheets of the Banco de la Nación and the private banks and study the dynamics of the
entire system. This is justified, if, as actually happened, the private banks have an implicit insurance
guarantee from the state bank. We have repeated our empirical exercise with this aggregation of all the
banks and the results were unchanged.
11 That is, we assume gold flows are not (or, at least, not entirely) driven by the trade balance in the manner
of David Hume’s price-specie-flow mechanism. Indeed, in this short-run model there is no real adjustment.
Rather, we appeal to John Stuart Mill’s view of an adjustment process driven in large part by capital flows.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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dG/dt = λ G(i – i* + κ ;…),
where Gi > 0. To enrich the discussion of comparative dynamics we add two new parameters not
in our original model: λ captures the responsiveness of external capital flows to price signals, and
κ is the country’s risk premium, that is for the present exogenous but could depend on the
government’s overall fiscal scenario.
This is a very simple myopic model, where agents respond to instantaneous signals and
there is no forward-looking behavior. There are no jumping (co-state) variables and the (G,r)
variables define a classic deterministic dynamical system. Closure of the model depends on the
specification of a function i(G,r) to describe money market equilibrium as a function of bank
balance sheets and the money base. A standard money-market equilibrium gives the model
closure, and need not be repeated here (see the appendix). There are two possible cases, one
where ￿i/￿r > 0 and one where ￿i/￿r < 0. In the former (normal) case when bank reserves rise,
ceteris paribus the money multiplier falls by the direct withdrawal of cash from the market, so the
money market tightens. In the latter case, “confidence” effects dominate and when the public sees
bank reserves rising their demand for bank deposits (broad money) rises even more, because they
feel that banks are safer; thanks to the money multiplier, the switch from cash to deposits expands
the money supply, so the money market slackens.
Which  of  these  two  scenarios  prevails  has  important  consequences  for  the  overall
dynamic solution of the model and the phase diagram in (G,r)-space. So too does the presence or
absence of the crony mechanism captured by the sign of φ´(r). Thus, there are four cases to
consider, as shown in Figure 1, and explained in the appendix. The characterization of such local
equilibria is simple, but some appeal to intuition is needed to imagine the nature and layout of
potential equilibria in a real-world setting. As noted, we think it likely, if not obvious, that the
“confidence” effect will dominate at low levels of bank reserves, the kind of situation where
depositors get nervous. Also, we claim, the worst cronyism is more likely to erupt in “bad times”
in the economy—when bank reserves are low or when gold stocks are low.
With such assumptions in mind, the configuration of the full dynamical system can be
displayed once we set out the complete phase diagram in (G,r)-space, as shown in Figure 2. The
direction of trajectories is marked in the various regions delineated by the curves dr/dt=0 and
dG/dt=0. The intersections of the curves are two equilibria, labeled E1 and E2. The point E1, with
a high reserve level, corresponds to Figure 1(a) and is a stable node, a “good” equilibrium. The
point E2, with a low reserve level, corresponds to Figures 1(c) or (d) and is an unstable saddle
point, a “bad” equilibrium. A possible stable saddle path for E2 is shown as SS´ and this curvedella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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delineates two regions in the plane. Above SS´ is a stable zone where all paths lead to the sink at
E1. But below SS´ is an unstable regime where all paths lead to collapse.
12
As originally devised, this theoretical framework was ideal for the purpose of studying
the dynamics of internal and external convertibility in the Argentine case both before World War
One, when the dynamics worked favorably, and in the interwar resumption of 1927–29, when
they did not. The key question was: how could a well-defined dynamical system that had once
worked so well under the old prewar gold standard then fail so miserably just a few years later?
Our model supplies an answer. The evidence suggests to us that during the Argentine Belle
Époque prior to World War I, the money and banking system was operating in the stable zone of
the phase diagram, in the vicinity of the stable equilibrium E1, with high confidence in the regime
sustained by high reserve ratios. The resemblance of the upper right zone of Figure 3 to the stable
equilibrium E1 depicted in Figure 2 is striking. The trajectory fluctuated but it did not explode
unidirectionally. The gold-standard system was a stable one at the beginning of the century
because it was combined with prudent inside-money practices. (VAR analysis confirms this
conclusion. See della Paolera and Taylor 2002)
This regime ended in 1914: external shocks and domestic policy choices made gradual,
seemingly  innocuous  changes  in  the  institutional  framework.  The  emergency  rediscount
provisions  of  the  Banco de la Nación and the Conversion Office introduced some implicit
guarantees into the financial system and increased the scope for moral hazard and abuse. To its
credit, the Conversion Office kept its emergency powers in reserve. It was not so at the Banco de
la Nación, where rediscounting and nonperforming loans grew steadily after 1914. The pollution
of the balance sheet of the Banco de la Nación from 1914 to 1927 is represented in Figure 2 by
the line E1-P. Thus, we argue, the system arrived at a point like P by the late 1920s. The
dynamical system set to work again during the brief 1927–29 resumption, but this time from new
initial conditions at a point like P, with movement along a path like PP'. The trajectory in the
lower left zone of Figure 3 reveals a trajectory much like the putative path PP' in Figure 2. Again,
the correspondence between the empirical trajectories and the phase diagram is striking. (VAR
analysis also confirms this claim. See della Paolera and Taylor 2002)
This is a clean theory that links the demise of the gold standard convertibility regime to
the pollution of the Argentine financial system in the 1920s through the persistence of “Gaucho
Banking” practices. Yet does theory map into history so cleanly? What additional historical
evidence is there to support this notion? We think there is quite a lot, and we summarize it briefly.
                                                       
12 Note that this will not generate a crisis in the form of a complete drain of the gold stock—an external
convertibility crisis—since the dynamics of G in the unstable region are such as to take paths away from G
= 0. Rather, it is a region in which the bank collapses—that is, an internal convertibility crisis is the real
threat.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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From the 1820s to the 1880s the multiple banks of issue in Argentina were noted for their
exaggerated provision of cheap credit to finance federal and state administrations; in that setting
the  nominal  anchors  were  very  weak.  After  the  Baring  crisis  in  1890—91,  the  Pellegrini
government designed a new regime. Two institutions were central to the plan and they were kept
at arm’s length so as effectively to isolate two functions. The note issue, ultimately backed by
gold—that is, outside money and external convertibility—was the sole task of the Conversion
Office.  State  and  commercial  banking  activities—that  is,  inside  money  and  internal
convertibility—were the domain of the Banco de la Nación and the rest of the financial system. It
was hoped that this separation of powers would constitute a more robust and credible regime by
keeping  inflationary  pressures  and  banking  activity  separate  from  the  institution  that  was
ultimately responsible for the currency.
The Banco de la Nación maintained a clean balance sheet at first, as we can see from
Figure 4. Then, in the crisis 1913–14 an emergency rediscount law was enacted. Rediscounting
surged as a fraction of all banking activity, non-performing loans rose, and the capitalization level
of the bank sank. This corrosion of balance sheets was in no way a function of crony lending
relations with the government, but rather crony loans to the other banks and the private sector, as
we  can  see  from  the  asset  quality  indicators  in  Figure  5.  Simple  counterfactual  liquidity
calculations suggest that the Banco de la Nación helped a wounded banking system limp along
for many years in the 1920s and 1930s (della Paolera and Taylor 2002). Why? We know the bank
did not have an explicit lender-of-last-resort mandate. It was not a true central bank and arrogated
these powers in an ad hoc fashion. Why was the rediscount law enacted? And why did the bank
take on the risks associated with rediscounting to private banks with weak collateral?
It is easy to identify one group that gained from the new policy. The state bank’s
rediscounting provided a bailout to the private banks once, ex post, it became clear to them that
their balance sheets were in a bad state. In essence, the private banks obtained, if not free, then
highly subsidized banking insurance from a government that had made no such commitment ex
ante. That such an inconsistent policy choice should have been made says a good deal about the
machinations inside the Argentine corridors of power. Rich and powerful interests, including
officers and shareholders of the banks, desperately needed cover from the risks they had taken,
the loans that had gone bad. Some of those same loans, we also know from confidential records,
were loans to the very same officers and shareholders, or to their real or shadow corporations.
We see here how Gaucho Banking has been very resilient. Even after the Baring Crash
had wiped out most of the Argentine banking system, the spirit of Gaucho Banking lived on into
the interwar period. Ultimately, in 1935, as part of a political-economy solution worked out by
the government and its new central bank, the banks got the final bailout they sought to head off
an insolvency crisis arising from decades of bad loans. It cost about 7% of GDP and was perhapsdella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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the biggest single “Gaucho Banking” action of all time, at least until the present crisis.
13 One
might imagine that after such a disastrous experience, Gaucho Banking would have been laid to
rest. But from the years of financial repression of the early postwar period to the opening of the
economy in the 1990s, this trait appears to have survived, albeit with a different twist today.
3. Gaucho Banking Today
Naturally, a small country such as Argentina, is always vulnerable to foreign shocks—such as the
Tequila Effect, the Asian Contagion, the Russian default, and the Brazilian devaluation—yet all
of these different shocks were handled perhaps as well as could be expected within a second-best
hard-peg regime. However, we claim that while the Argentine outside money mechanism and
banking regime were regularly proclaimed as the darlings of the emerging markets, there was
always, since the inception of the Convertibility Plan a deep problem in the design of the money-
banking nexus.
By now it is, we hope, widely accepted that the 1990s Convertibility Law was in fact a
dollar-exchange  standard  regime  and  more.  At  first,  everyone  saw  its  short-run  aim  as
establishing  a  nominal  anchor  and  decisively  ending  the  recurrent  use  of  the  inflation  tax
mechanism but it also respected the choice of agents to basically use the U.S. dollar for large
transactions and as the medium to store value and hold wealth. Yet it was not immune to internal
weakness and a law that was supposedly robust in its respect for acquired property rights (i.e., a
fixed peso-dollar commitment) could not endure in the Argentine political economy nexus.
This flaw was visible even during the earliest crises. During the Tequila crisis, good luck
was on the Argentine side because Mexico was bailed out essentially by the United States and the
crisis was short-lived. But there too, the potential inconsistency between a dollar-exchange
standard and a banking system that “creates” money (even inside dollar money) was brought to
the forefront. Curiously enough, few saw that this inconsistency was in the end going to serve as
a crucible for the most extraordinary and rapid economic meltdown effect that we have ever seen
in any emerging market economy. What also should become clear is that the real disaster began
about the time when agents started to feel that even the most basic property rights were being
repudiated by the monetary and fiscal authorities.
Thus, there is a crucial difference as compared to the 1929 crisis. Back then it was the
rottenness of the private sector that hampered the solvency of the financial sector. In the present
                                                       
13 Many of the 1920s rediscounts eventually went bad and would end up on the state balance sheet and the
system was evolving toward a central banking idea in a very incoherent manner. It is important to stress
that in its rediscounting actions the Banco de la Nación was not engaged in pure lender-of-last-resort
actions, like a true central bank following Bagehot’s principle of lending freely at a penalty rate. Such
actions would have left the bad loans with the private banks whilst extending temporary liquidity. Instead,
the state bank lent cash at only 4.5 percent—far below even the rate offered on time deposits!della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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episode, the insolvency of the public sector (and the unwillingness, incompetence, weakness, or
political fragility of the Alliance government) put in motion a catastrophic dynamic path that
polluted the monetary, financial and pension plan system.
So why make a comparison with 1929? We will argue that still, in both cases, the
transmission mechanisms were the same. In both cases, we are in the presence of a system that
can easily jump from a good equilibrium situation to a bad or terminal one, if it is buffeted by a
large enough exogenous internal or external shock. And in both cases, the exogenous shocks were
internal to Argentina and generated by Gaucho Banking behavior that was unconstrained (indeed,
encouraged) by the political economy structure. However, one key difference is that because the
Argentine economy was in 2001–02 acutely dollarized, but was not in 1929 “metallized”, it was
inevitable that today’s meltdown process would be much, much faster than in the past.
14
In Figure 6, we show proxies for the solvency situation of the private and public sectors
and it is clear that, even when we know that the activity level was already in a deep slump by
1999, the driving force behind worsening expectations was the solvency of the government and
some official banks like the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. This is exactly what is shown
in Figure 7, where there is a “neutral” evolution in the quality of banking assets until, say,
January 2000; but then after that the driving force is expected solvency of the government’s debt,
where we must also understand that from April 2001 the banks and pension plan firms were
absorbing more and more public bonds.
It is opportune at this stage to recall Figure 2 and its underlying theory, and ask what help
the Augmented DF model might be in understanding the dynamics of the 2001 crisis. Unlike
1914–27 there was no suspension of convertibility, in which case—one might ask—how could
the dynamical system shift from a stable to an unstable zone? There are several candidate
exogenous shocks that could have mattered, or, collectively, might have added to the probability
of a transition to explosive behavior by causing the state variables (or initial conditions) to change
discontinuously. Consider the following scenarios:
1.  Country risk shocks. Due to “news” about underlying fiscal problems there is a sudden
increase in country risk κ. In Figure 2 this corresponds to a need for higher equilibrium
domestic interest rates to maintain external equilibrium. This means a leftward shift in the
dG/dt=0 curve, hence a leftward and upward shift in the unstable equilibrium E2 and an
upward shift in the saddle path SS′. That is, the unstable area on the plane expands. If it
expands to include the current (G,r) point, then the system becomes unstable. In fact, a large
enough shock to κ could lead to a “catastrophe” outcome where the qualitative behavior of
                                                       
14 Economic agents in 1929 had not experienced monetary expansion abuses since 1891, while in 2001
memories of hyperinflation in 1989–90 and persistent inflation taxes since the 1950s were very fresh.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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the system changes—if the dG/dt=0 curve moves so far to the left that it no longer intersects
the dr/dt=0 curve then suddenly there are no equilibria at all.
2.  “Hotter money” shocks. Due to structural changes in the markets there is a sudden increase in
the parameter λ (external capital flows become more responsive to prices, as might happen if
external borrowing is terminated and “gold flows” must finance all imbalances). This leads
the dynamics in the G dimension to speed up without shifting the location of the equilibria.
The effect is to rotate the saddle path SS′ about E2 to a flatter position, again expanding the
unstable zone.
3.  Illiquid asset shocks. Due to structural changes in the markets there is a sudden decrease in
the parameter ν (banks must adjust their portfolios more slowly, as might happen if a real
shock—a  recession—leads  to  more  uncallable  loans  in  the  short  run).  This  leads  the
dynamics in the r dimension to slow down without shifting the location of the equilibria.
Again effect is to rotate the saddle path SS′ to a flatter position, again expanding the unstable
zone.
4.  A “bank robbery” shock. There is a one-time “theft” of reserves r from the banks in exchange
for debt in a nonmarket (i.e., forced loan) type of transaction. This causes the system to jump
in (G,r)-space vertically downwards by the amount of the theft. In 2001 we associate this
forced saving with the government’s decision to impose the so-called “megaswap” on the
financial sector in 2001. (An exogenous shock to the confidence function could also be added
here, if agents are moved to suspect additional future robberies, compounding the problem.)
Of course, it is possible to tell a story of the 2001 crisis using some or all of these elements, and
we do not wish to assert a monocausal explanation. All such factors surely contributed, but our
reading of history, based on the timing and magnitude of the shocks, leans toward treating the
fourth and final mechanism as the most important exogenous force, as we shall argue below.
Moreover, we think it is also true that the “megaswap” bank robbery (#4), via the institutional
pollution it engendered, also endogenously changed market reactions via increased country risk
(#1) and even hotter flows of hard currency (#2). Our narrative henceforth pursues this line of
argument.
It should be recalled that this was, all the same, a period with tremendous external shocks
and recession that the Argentine system nonetheless withstood. There were signs of increasing
health, even. In these years the level of monetization in the economy (the increase in the demand
for financial assets within the system) was impressive until 1999 (see Table 1). And the evolution
of “voluntary dollarization”—the choice in the denomination of deposits and loans by agents and
banks—was stable at a high level of 62 percent. Overall a fairly robust monetary and financial
scenario held through 1999: official data show that financial deepening (M3 and deposits relativedella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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to GDP) was improving until early 2000 and non-performing loans did not show any major
alteration until 2001.
Thus, we share with many the view that the deep force in the crisis was fiscal: robbing
the banks was merely a desperate attempt to alleviate that problem. Bad fiscal behavior need not
have affected private banks, or international reserves, if the laws passed in 1991 had been
respected. But economic agents understood all too well (based on Argentine history, we would
argue) that these laws might not be enough to leave secure these parts of the economic system in
the renewed presence of intense populist demands that put property rights in peril.
As shown in Figure 8, an ongoing change in the political regime was underway by
October 2000, which was concluded in early April with the change in the macroeconomic and
central bank policy regime (the return of Cavallo and departure of Pou). From this perspective,
April 2001 was the end: the fateful jump from a manageable and still, technocratically speaking,
reversible situation to disaster. As in the 1914–27–29 episode, changes in laws (and hence in
expectations and/or property rights) produced a jump from a sustainable money-banking nexus to
an unsustainable one. The evidence supports this historical parallel. Figure 8 shows that the nexus
of international reserves and the reserve-deposit ratio was a stable one for the 1996–99 period.
What is very impressive is the speed of adjustment of economic agents to the change in the
macroeconomic and central bank regime in April 2001, a change that was arguably foretold with
the demise of Economy Minister López Murphy in March. Again, the alteration of the dollar-
exchange standard and the intervention of the Central Bank in early April 2001 marks a break:
from an expectational point of view it was the end of the regime as we knew it from 1991.
Where then did the weakness of the money-banking nexus originate and how was it
obscured for so long? Our main argument is that already within the 1991 Convertibility Law and
with a political-economy structure prone to disrespect property rights, the money-banking regime
was fragile. And clearly it was fragile basically because the Central Bank of Argentina could not
with one instrument attain the two goals of internal and external convertibility: to support the
external value of the peso and to shore up an eventual crunch in the (mostly dollar-denominated)
monetary liabilities of the system. While the banks were creating “argendollars” the Central Bank
could not, of course, print actual dollars.
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Economic agents were always well aware of this talon de aquiles of the system—and the
only signal they needed to foresee a change in the regime was a populist government putting a tax
levy on genuine resources. On that signal they had to run to get their resources out as fast as they
could. The period March 2001 to November 2001 was one of “disaster dynamics”—to paraphrase
                                                       
15 An opportunity to change this state of affairs was clearly present after the warning events of the Tequila
crisis but the solution, which was then deemed satisfactory, was simply the negotiation of a substantial
contingent credit line with international organizations. In the end, this proved inadequate to the task.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Pou (2002). Even if the dynamics were not exactly monotonic (the August hiatus is explained
below) there is a clear path towards crash in Figure 8.
The path was assured when the advance of the government over banks and private
pension funds took place with the famous (or infamous) “megaswap” that converted public debt
into a 30-year bond but at 16 per cent interest rate. Two thirds of this swap was absorbed by
domestic financial institutions. But already in April, with respect to dynamics, many in the public
had a suspicion that banks might end up colluding with a government in fiscal freefall. It was
then, in early 2001, that there emerged a war of attrition at first between the sophisticated
investors and the government-banking axis (Phase 1: April–June) and then between virtually all
private agents and government-banking axis (Phase 2: September–November).
The game played out as follows. With the banks aligned to the government objectives,
banks realigned their asset side to support the public sector; the private agents, in the meantime,
detected the incipient cronyism, and began to realign the banks’ liability side. The banks started
to recoup credits from the private sector, and the lending rate (30-days dollar) for AAA corporate
debt rose in eight months from 13% in February to 27% in October 2001. At the same time
lending to the public sector jumped from one third of total lending to almost a half by the end of
2001 (see Table2). Thus the private sector was crowded out and the banks became polluted.
To make things more dramatic, the public’s “voluntary dollarization” increased from a
stable two-thirds level in terms of loans and deposits (where it had been for many years) to almost
75 per cent just before the implementation of the bank deposit freeze (corralito). The private
agents thus tried to hedge more and more against a domestic institution and adopted more dollar
denominated assets. Hence, even when uncertainty was paramount, the economic agents and the
authorities (intentionally or not) were enhancing dollarization. At this point, the war of attrition
was at its culminating moment. Either the system would break in favor of a discretionary soft-
budget  monetary  regime,  or  there  was  going  to  be  (total)  dollarization  and  a  substantial
adjustment in the cash flow in dollars of public (national and provincial) finances.
There was one faint hope for the depositors. At some point, the public had believed that
the internationalization of the banks would play a role at a crucial hour in forcing a respect for the
rules of the game. Perhaps they also believed that external discipline from the IMF would also
protect the rule of law against abuses. Yet IMF help continued to arrive even after Argentina was
on the slippery slope with another loan tranche disbursed in August 2001, an action for which the
Fund has been extensively criticized elsewhere (e.g., Mussa 2002). We need not rehash these
criticisms here, but the final loan explains the August jump in international reserves (seen in
Figure 8), replenished by the IMF funds—but of course there was no change in fundamental
policy measures, and from the public’s perspective the government’s prior abuse of property
rights in April and May appeared to be tolerated, if not vindicated.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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With  the  arrival  of  the  crisis  seemingly  unconstrained  Gaucho  Banking  tendencies
emerged. By late 2001 the policy framework can only be described as one of chaotic desperation.
In the last two months fiscal and debt measures became chaotic and inchoate, and central-banking
resolutions accelerated dollarization. Some Argentines held on to the conviction that it would be
more complicated for the government to sack their assets if they were in a foreign bank and if
they were in genuinely dollar-denominated assets—but in the end not even these obstacles stood
in the way of the corralito in December and the pesification in January 2002.
4. The Political Economy of Gaucho Banking in 2001
Why do we characterize the behavior of banks as Gaucho Banking? In other words, is this a fair
description of what happened in the year 2001 in Argentina? Were banks coerced or did they
collude with political forces? And what pressures drove the political operators into such schemes?
The first fact is that banks colluded in the first half of 2001 with the Argentine Republic’s
government. Our interpretation is that during this brief period bank behavior bore the legacy of
past recurrent bailouts in not-so-distant Argentine financial history. The records of the 1981,
1985, and 1989/1990 bailout episodes, carried out under the auspices of the 1977 Banking Law,
were still fresh in the minds of agents and bankers alike. The presence of a radically different
monetary regime, the dollar-exchange standard, was surely underestimated and did not prevent
bankers from engaging in a risky play of trying to temporarily “bail out” the government. The
initial switch by banks in April 2001 and May 2002 towards investing in high-yield sovereign
bonds was the start of an extremely risky policy—one that we think can be transparently seen as a
collusive outcome between most banks and the government. The implicit agreement was simple:
you help me now and I will help you in the immediate future.
These dangerous liaisons are well recognized we think, as in de la Torre, Levy Yeyati
and Schmukler (this volume, quote from the draft version):
Instead of recognizing that debt restructuring was becoming a necessity following the
failed attempts to restore growth, the government averted debt service arrears by draining
the liquidity of the financial system. In April 2001, the government used moral suasion to
place U$S 2 billion of bonds with banks in Argentina, allowing banks to use those bonds
to meet up to 18 percent of the liquidity requirement. The banking system thus became
substantially less liquid and much more exposed to a government default…As choices to
finance the deficit through debt rapidly shrank, the specter of money printing loomed
bigger… (emphasis added)della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Moral suasion, which is far weaker than coercion, could have been resisted by the banks. But it
was not. In other words, to an extent that was unknown under the Convertibility Plan, fiscal needs
and the monetary base were again firmly intertwined from April 2001. This is where the pollution
of the entire regime began.
We know that banks were also subject to moral suasion to take the “megaswap” in the
summer and by then, we believe, they were quite convinced that if the high returns did not
materialize they would be (somehow) bailed out by the government. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to speculate as to ex ante where they thought these resources would come from—and if this
would involve pesification. By the end, however, they surely saw pesification as a potential
answer (see Velasco and Hausmann, this volume) if the scheme was to fail. Our approach
suggests one way to understand how it did fail: the government and the banks neglected to
include in their calculation an even more intelligent group of agents, the public. If the banking
sector is weakened “disaster dynamics” can take over as the “war” between the agents and the
state unwinds. We have documented this progression for Argentina from early 2001.
However, in addition to the direct relationship between the private banks and the state,
we argue that the central government was engaged in a war on another front—with the provincial
governments (and their own banks), especially the large and opposition-controlled Province of
Buenos Aires. The fiscal “war of attrition” is an old idea, but a new twist in the Argentine crisis
was the expansion of battlefield. Specifically, provincial policies turned the Banco de la Provincia
de Buenos Aires into a very large bomb. This had important consequences for the implosion of
the banking sector and reveals a severe political economy constraint in a caudillo world.
Looking back at Figure 6 we can see that the national government was not the sole bank
robber. It is striking that the behavior of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires is singularly
characterized  by  a  massive  explosion  in  crony  lending  as  judged  by  the  evolution  of
nonperforming loans for the year 2000. The differential behavior between the Banco de la Nacion
Argentina, controlled by the national government, and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
(BPBA), controlled by the duhaldismo wing of the Peronist party, hints that already, starting in
2000, there was an emerging fiscal war of attrition between the government and the most
important Argentine province controlled by the opposition. Moreover, this war was not merely to
be contested on the usual battlefield of receipts, taxes, and the fight over provincial revenue
sharing under the federal compact. Rather, by extracting resources from its state bank, the BPBA,
the new offensive had implications for the larger financial system, and begged questions as to the
national government’s lender of last resort capability.
This game, its political economy, and its conduit through the BPBA, has been neglected
but is highly relevant for our understanding of the larger fiscal crisis, its transmission in part from
the provincial to the federal level, and its infection of the banking system. The game unfolded asdella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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a contest between a national government that, initially, was desperately sticking to the established
rules of the game, and the opposing forces of duhaldismo and the traditional political class, which
could only survive if soft money was provided on a continuous basis. It need hardly be said that
for most of the 1991–98 period, the soft money conduit had not been threatened: the national
government had been in Peronist hands, the economy had been booming its way out of a long
slump, and fiscal largesse had been accommodated, thanks to the leeway provided by a highly
liquid international capital market. Fiscal problems were present (e.g. the country ran persistent
public-sector deficits even during boom times); but, to most, they were not very apparent. When
international liquidity ebbed, the war of fiscal attrition broke out in the banking and the monetary
arena with the printing of provincial quasi-monies, in particular, the patacones.
Thus, in the fiscal arena, the Convertibility Law forced the question for the nation and the
provinces. The pretense of provincial governments was that they could use provincial and state
banks just as the national government was using the financial system and the liquidity of
convertible pesos for fiscal needs—and that all quasi-monies would always be accepted at par
with the Argentine convertible peso. Convertibility and a sound banking system were essentially
at odds with the old political economy status quo: hence pesification was the populist course of
action that loomed closer for almost a year, gathering support at home and abroad.
Ironically, although some of the worst fiscal leakages originated from the bonaerense
authorities, after a few more moves in the endgame the provincial leader was eventually installed
as the President of the Republic just as pesification was implemented. During the wars of
Argentine succession, reports were rife that duhaldismo usurped power through a crude power
struggle on the street; but in many ways the key fighting had taken place much earlier—not on
the streets but on the books. Leading the fiscal war with other provinces and running down the
assets of the BPBA was a major part of the economic coup d’état that ended the convertible
regime and de la Rua’s authority. The change of presidents was then something of a coup de
grace that put the convertibility plan out of its misery, allowing space for default, pesification,
property rights adaptation, Gaucho Banking and the like.
5. Lessons from the Past and Present
The purpose of this paper was to compare two crises in more detail, with the hope that the lessons
of two failed convertibility plans can inspire better performance in the future. The two crises of
1929 and 2001 exhibit many similarities in their dynamics but important differences in their root
causes. Undoubtedly, the monetary regime was a striking common factor in both cases. Under a
gold standard (or dollar standard) regime, adjustments in the money-banking nexus need to be
decisive and fast. Attempts to use monetary and banking institutions in a discretionary way todella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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“lean against the wind” can backfire once the (very tight) limits on room for maneuver are
reached.
16
This is not news to Argentines. Alec Ford’s vision was of a gold standard that amplified
economic cycles:
It is easy to understand the dislike of some Argentines for a system which
dictated  that  a  slump  must  be  aggravated  by  monetary  reactions,  although,
doubtless, they had forgotten that the same system served to enhance booms.
(Ford 1962, p. 188).
Silvio Gesell held a similar view:
Our money is so intimately and solidly linked to gold, as the pound sterling is
and even more so than the franc and the mark…. If, in some faroff country with a
gold standard, a crisis develops, this crisis will have immediate repercussions for
the Argentine paper currency…. And it should be that way, as that is what the
Law of Conversion is all about. He that enjoys the advantages of an international
money must also accept its inconveniences, the pros and the cons of monetary
solidarity. (Gesell 1909, p. 56).
One cannot be in any doubt that policymakers, in Buenos Aires or in Washington, knew that this
was the price to be paid for the chosen anchor. In light of this, policymakers will again have to
question  whether  they  really  can  tolerate  the  limits  imposed  on  them  by  ultra-hard  pegs,
especially when the institutional superstructure of their economies is not as highly developed as
their ambitions.
Hard pegs and open capital markets can expose soft money and banking regimes to harsh
tests. This is an unavoidable implication of the trilemma. There can be no lender of last resort and
almost no monetary activism is possible except within tightly prescribed limits. And there can be
almost no policy independence whatsoever if fiscal options are closed off by a debt ceiling, the
situation in Argentina in 2001. Paradoxically, when the options are most limited, we think history
shows that this is can be where the going may get very dangerous indeed. Policymakers can then
be tempted by desperate measures: printing money or, what is in some ways the same thing, and
arguably more forthright, actually robbing the banks.
The collapse of the first convertibility plan in 1929 can be traced to changes in money
and banking laws of 1914. But this set in motion a very slow train wreck—because convertibility
was suspended until 1927, and only then was the instability exposed. Moreover, demand for
money in peso form was still almost universal. The collapse of second convertibility plan in 2001
was also due to changes in money and banking regime. This was a fast train wreck because there
was no suspension, dollarization was already very high, and because the institutional changes
                                                       
16 This is not to say there is zero “room for maneuver” under hard pegs—just, relatively speaking, not very
much (see Frankel, Serven and Schmukler 2002; and Obstfeld, Taylor, and Shambaugh 2002).della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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were so large. Yet the main thing to note, we think, is that in 1929 asset pollution originated in
private sector (with bank complicity) but in 2001 it originated in public sector (with bank
complicity). Either way, the cronyism of banks was a crucial factor in encouraging the destruction
of seemingly robust monetary and financial institutions.
We agree with many observers that the root problem in 2001 was fiscal, and our paper
merely suggests ways in which fiscal problems can be more or less dangerous depending on the
ways in which their collateral damage is (or is not) contained by clean institutions. As we have
noted, at the end of the day, if the long run budget constraint is to hold and fiscal conditions are
unsustainable then the authorities have to default on something. Perhaps the most pressing
question is why the situation could not have been allowed to proceed via a simple and orderly
default process, if indeed fiscal sustainability was the problem, since at least that might have
avoided the collapse of the entire money and banking system too. The failure to navigate to such
a  position  turned  a  serious,  but  technically  manageable,  default  into  a  complete  and  utter
meltdown of the economy and its institutions.
What are the alternatives? More research is needed, but assuming one is living in a
Gaucho Banking world, more serious consideration could be given to an alternative second best
monetary regime: dollarization, plus a more robust separation between outside money and inside
money than was seen in either the 1920s or the 1990s—a policy, perhaps, of narrow banking.
Good property rights in money and banking can coexist even with a rotten fiscal regime. The
latter means that the economy is going to be fragile, but in a more safe second best situation.
Under dollarization and narrow banking you will not have to suffer potentially catastrophic leaks
from the fiscal side to the monetary and banking nexus. Separating outside money from inside
money will not cure the problem of excess voracity in the fiscal domain, but one advantage would
be that economic agents would feel an immediate effect through the pricing of their assets in
banks if the balance sheets of the banks were polluted by fiscal spillovers. In other words, you
would know more transparently if your bank was being robbed. The value of deposits might be
volatile, but a terminal state in which the losses are ex post socialized would be avoided. The
corralito and pesification solutions might then be avoided.
Another policy that might implement more constraints on Gaucho activity would be free
pricing of provincial debt, which also formed a large and increasing share of bank assets in 2001,
including the notorious quasi-monies such as the patacones. The provinces were (and still are)
another polluting factor in the accelerating fiscal implosion, but this reflected in part their
remarkable ability to float the bearer bonds. But this was only because the Argentine government
in 2001, instead of accepting the provincial monies as fiscal receipts at a market (discounted)
value, allowed the payment of taxes with those provincial monies at par. To state it baldly: by
unifying the federal and provincial balance sheets with this decree, and effectively permitting alldella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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the provinces to this print unlimited pesos, the convertibility plan was technically over. The act of
taking control of the note issue away from the Central Bank was remarkable—not only in that it
turned the clock back to the 1880s, but also because of the notable lack of dissent this plan
generated. In the face of an unwillingness on the part of the provinces to adjust, the better
solution would have been to impose on the provinces a market discipline for their debt issue via a
floating exchange rate for their quasi-monies, while still being able to preserve a convertible
regime (even short of dollarizing) at the national level.
What next? Progress will be slow. A new political class could address the crony functions
of the banks, especially the quasi-public banks, to remove the serious corruption problem from
the money and banking regime. As in the 1890s this might mean the wholesale closure of the
crony  banks  themselves,  which  happened  back  then  under  keen  pressure  from  London
(Illustration 1). Even then, it did not eradicate the problem forever. To take such a step now
would be a very radical plan. However, it might be the only way to end Gaucho Banking and
deliver a clean money-banking nexus in an institutionally weak economy, though it is quite hard
to see this happening without strong external pressure, for example, through IMF conditionality.
Robbing the banks was the only means for the old political class to survive—if only briefly—by
socializing the losses, but it has left a burden on future generations that is immensely high.
Our brief tour of Argentine history convinces us that the Gaucho Banking problem
identified  by  Lawson  more  than  a  century  ago  still  remains  to  be  solved.  Without  some
fundamental changes to its monetary-fiscal-banking architecture, Argentina will experience
instability problems for decades to come. To recapitulate, Gaucho Banking is a scenario where
either the public or the private sector through complicity with the banks imposes a capital levy (a
grab from depositors). Knowing the perils of time-inconsistent behavior, no developed country
today would countenance such expedients. There may be other problems in designing banking
policies, but if anything they revolve around the reverse fear, worries over a “negative capital
levy” (a gift to depositors) arising from bailouts via moral hazard. But for Argentina in 2001 the
concern was that of a more ancien regime: to use the banks as a fiscal source for a government
bailout.  Welcome  to  the  Willie  Sutton  School  of  Public  Policy:  when  modern  economic
orthodoxy collides with caudillo-style institutional backwardness and leadership complicity, a
desperate regime with its hands tied in both monetary and fiscal domains will be sorely tempted
by a “capital levy” on the financial sector because, as the man said when asked why he robbed
banks, “that’s where the money is.” Unfortunately, that money doesn’t last forever.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Theoretical Appendix
The model focuses on two major financial entities. The Conversion Office has a balance sheet that consists
of liabilities in the form of circulating notes H (high-powered money or monetary base), and assets
comprised of gold G and securities S. By assumption, H = G + S. The banking sector (the public Banco de
la Nación and others), treated here as a representative bank, has a balance sheet with liabilities comprised
of banking deposits both private D and public D´, and assets in the form of note reserves R (vault cash) and
loans L. Here, R + L = D + D´.
The demand for broad money is assumed to be standard, given by M = m(c,r) (G + S), where
m(c,r) = (1 + c)/(c + rα) is the money multiplier, α = (D + D´)/D is the ratio of total to private deposits,
r￿=￿R/(D + D´) is the reserve-to-total-deposit ratio of the bank, and c = (H – R)/D is the currency-to-private-
deposit ratio of the (non-bank) public. Clearly, ∂m/∂r < 0 and we can also assume that ∂m/∂c < 0, since
r α￿<￿1 in the empirically relevant range. The currency-to-private-deposit ratio c desired by the public is
assumed to depend on how banks behave. A higher reserve ratio at the bank inspires confidence and leads
to a lower demand for currency, so that c￿=￿c(r), where c' < 0. Given the public’s choice of c, we can then
write broad money M as M￿=￿µ(r)￿(G+S), where µ(r) = m(c(r),r).
An important feature is that the relationship of the multiplier to the reserve-to-total-deposit ratio r
is ambiguous and the cases µ′(r) < 0 and µ′(r) > 0 are both possible. We argue for an intuitive mapping
between this derivative and the reserve level. In the usual case, when bank reserves r > r1 are adequate, we
shall assume that µ(r)′ < 0, so that confidence effects, operating via c(r), are not dominant. But when bank
reserves r < r1 are sufficiently small we shall assume that the public gets nervous, their currency holdings
react more acutely to the reserve level, µ′(r) > 0, and confidence effects dominate.
Money-market equilibrium will generate an equilibrium interest rate such that µ(r) (G+S) = L(i,y),
where Li < 0, Ly > 0. The model is purely a short-run model of crisis so it is assumed that output y remains
exogenous in the short run. We invert and solve for the interest rate i = i(r,G;…) using the implicit function
theorem. Clearly, iG < 0; but the sign of ir is ambiguous, of the opposite sign to µ′(r), and the latter is
ambiguous because of the confidence problem. Dynamics complete the model as described in the main text.
As we show in  della Paolera and Taylor (2002) this dynamical system admits four types of
equilibria, described as follows and shown in Figure 1. The first is the standard solution given by
Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984):
1.  Normal Conditions—High Reserves and a Stable Equilibrium: Assume that reserve ratios r >
r0 = max(r1,r2) are sufficiently high. There is “confidence”: an increase in the reserve-deposit
ratio by the bank tightens the money market, and lures the public back into holding money
balances. For the bank, nothing besides profit motives affect leverage choice and φ(r) = 0.
Other solutions obtain under conditions of financial fragility and generate potentially unstable equilibria. If
reserve ratios r < r0 are sufficiently low there are three destabilizing possibilities:
2.  Confidence Problems and Weak or Absent Cronyism: Under these conditions, there are
confidence problems. For the public this means that the money multiplier is an increasing
function of reserves, µ′(r)>0, and hence ir < 0. For the bank, under low reserves either a
“credit crunch” operates, φ'(r) < 0, or, at worst, a weak crony effect, φ'(r) < 1. The steady state
is a focus, stable or unstable depending on the parameter values. (Note that without the
addition of the “crony bailout” mechanism, or some other forces, the unstable saddle-point
equilibrium described by Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984, 258–59) cannot exist.)
3.  Large Crony Problem and No Confidence Problems: As in the stable case, there are no
“confidence” problems, so µ(r) < 0, and hence ir > 0. For the bank, the “crony bailout” forces
operate and φ'(r) > 0. We assume now that this crony effect is sufficiently large, φ'(r) > 1. The
steady state is a saddle point.
4.  Confidence Problems and Large Crony Problems: Here both of the abnormal forces operate.
Confidence problems imply µ(r) > 0, and hence ir < 0. A large crony effect has φ'(r) > 1. The
arrows show that again the steady state is a saddle point.
In della Paolera and Taylor (2002) we argue that cases 3 or 4 are the appropriate model for the 1920s.
Conversely, we see case 1 as the likely characterization of the 1900–14 golden age.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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TABLE 1
MONETARY AND BANKING REGIMES AND MAJOR CRISES, 1890–2001
Monetary regime Banking regime
Previous peak to
















1890–91 Dirty float Law of national guaranteed banks 15% 5 108% 119% [1.4,3.7] [3.1,1.3]
1913–14 Gold standard (currency board) Commercial code 20% 7 -3% 21% [2.4,2.6] [2.2,1.8]
1929–31 Gold standard (currency board) Commercial code 14% 6 45% -8% [1.9,2.4] [3.7,2.4]
1980–81 Dirty float (crawling peg) Law of 1977 10% 7 ~2000% ~750% [3.8,5.7] [4.0,1.1]
1988–90 Dirty float (crawling peg) Law of 1977 8% 4 ~60000% ~50000% [3.4,12.8] [1.8,1.3]§
1994–95 Dollar standard (currency board) Law of 1977 3% 2 0% 0% [4.8,5.4] [3.5,2.7]
2001–02 Dollar standard (currency board) Law of 1977 ≥ 22% ? ≥ 8 ? >260% >40% [2.9,3.4]† [4.0,3.0]†
* M3 and M0 in pesos only, excluding dollar cash and accounts. † Up to the bank freeze, December 2001. §The multiplier rose during the hyperinflation.
Sources: From della Paolera and Taylor (2003) statistical appendix, except 1994–95 and 2001–02 ratios from Central Bank and Finance Ministry data. The other
figures from 2001–02 are based on a GDP peak in 1998 and “?” indicates they are purely speculative based on conditions at the time of writing. The 22% peak-
to-trough figure in the last row is based on the reported 9% fall in real GDP from 1998 to 2001, and the latest 13% year-to-year fall reported for 2001–02 (Q2),
with both figures taken from Informe Económico Trimestral online at       http://www.mecon.ar     . This is a lower bound on the overall peak-to-trough fall. The 8 year
figure for recovery of previous peak is based on an upper bound guess of 5% growth per annum over the next four years.
TABLE 2
MONETARY AND BANKING EVOLUTION 1995–2001
￿ Financial Fragility ￿ Evolution of Dollarization ￿ “Crowding Out”
￿ M3/M0 M0/Reserves M3/International Reserves Change in Deposits (%)* D*/(D+D*) L*/(L+L*)
Ratio of public credit
to total credit
1995 3.9 0.94 3.7 — 0.57 0.58 32%
1996 3.9 1.03 4.0 19.5 0.58 0.60 33%
1997 3.7 1.04 3.8 21.9 0.56 0.61 31%
1998 4.2 0.88 3.7 11.8 0.58 0.62 30%
1999 4.2 0.89 3.7 2.3 0.62 0.62 33%
2000 4.5 0.90 4.0 3.3 0.65 0.62 35%
2001 6.9 0.78 5.4 -17.7 ￿ 0.74 0.71 ￿ 47%
Sources: Central Bank and Finance Ministry data.della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 1













(b)  Confidence Problem with Credit Crunch 










(b)  Confidence Problem with Credit Crunch 










(c) Large Crony Effect Only
(b)  Confidence Problem with Credit Crunch 








r = 0della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 2
Phase Diagram for Prewar and Interwar Argentina
Reserve-Deposit Ratio 




















Path to collapse after pollution of banking 
system during suspension of convertibilitydella Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 3
Data for 1908–14 and 1927–29
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1927:8–1929:11della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 4













Capital/Loans (Right Axis)della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 5
The  rot  of  bank  balance  sheets  1914–34:





1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934
public sector credit indicator: government bond yield
private sector credit indicator: non performing loans, BNA %della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 6
The  rot  of  bank  balance  sheets  1996–2001
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public sector credit indicator: government bond yield
private sector credit indicator: non performing loans, system %
private sector credit indicator: non performing loans, BNA %
private sector credit indicator: non performing loans, BPBA %della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 7
The  rot  of  bank  balance  sheets  1999–2001:










Jan-99 Apr-99 Jul-99 Oct-99 Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Jan-01 Apr-01 Jul-01 Oct-01
Private rot indicator (change in nonperforming loan ratio times private share)
Public rot indicator (change in government debt price times share of public debt)della Paolera and Taylor Gaucho Banking Redux
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Figure 8
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Illustration 1
The Cure for Gaucho Banking?
The “London Consensus” After the Baring Crash
Caption: “John Bull ordena que los bancos oficiales sean reducidos a cenizas asi prevaleceran en absoluto
el Banco de Londres y las ordenes de la City.” (John Bull orders that the official banks be reduced to ashes,
so that the power of the Bank of London and the orders of The City will prevail.)
Notes: This cartoon is a reference to the massive shock to the financial system during the Baring Crisis that
left the domestic banking sector in ruins. Only the foreign banks survived, many of them British. Seat and
bank are the same word in Spanish (banco), a play-on-words. Finance Minister Vicente Fidel López (left)
and President Carlos Pellegrini (right) make firewood from seats bearing the names of the Banco de la
Provincia de Buenos Aires and the Banco Nacional. Already in flames are the other provincial banks. The
Englishman  supervising  the  pyre  clutches  a  bag  of libras  esterlinas (pounds sterling) as teary-eyed
financiers look on.
Source: El mosquito, año 28, no. 1473, April 12, 1891.